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Stylized fact 1 
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 House values in England – particularly in London and SE 
– are amongst highest in world 
 
Mean price of single detached house (all transactions in 2008): 1) 
 Kensington:  4.3M £  
 Richmond:  1.2M £ (greenish London suburb) 
 Hackney :  770k £ (rather distressed London borough) 
 Cotswold:  470k £ (rural West of England) 
 
 Buying price per square metre second highest in the 
world (topped only by Monaco) 2) 
 
 
Sources: 1) Land Registry; 2) Globalpropertyguide.com (last accessed 3/2013) 
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Real house price growth in %, 
average 1970 - 2006 
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Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
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Stylized fact 2 
 House prices in UK (and particularly England) 
are also extremely volatile 
 
 UK as a whole substantially more volatile than 
single most volatile market in US 
 
 1980s/90s cycle: boom/bust in real terms  
 UK:   +83% / -38% 1) 
 Los Angeles:  +67% / -33% 2) 
 
Sources: 1) Nationwide; 2) Glaeser et al. (2008) 
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Stylized fact 3 
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 Volatility has increased in recent decades… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cheshire (2009) 
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And there is spatial variation in volatility… 
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Source: Nationwide, FT 
Stylized fact 4 
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 Housing units in UK are not only extremely 
expensive and volatile but also extremely 
small by international standards… 
 A new-build house in UK is 38% smaller than 
in densely populated Germany and… 
 40% smaller than in the even more densely 
populated Netherlands 
 And there are very few new-build homes… 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden (2005) 
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Stylized fact 4 (cont.) 
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Stylized fact 5 
11 
 Not just housing – office space in UK is also 
extremely expensive (and volatile) 
 Total office occupation costs per m2 in 
Birmingham in 2004: 44% higher than  
in Manhattan NY (KingSturge, 2004) 
 Construction costs about half  
(Cheshire & Hilber, 2008) 
 
 How can we make sense of this? 
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Derived research questions 
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 What factors cause the high level 
and volatility of prices and 
corresponding space shortage? 
 
 Might the British system of land 
use regulation be a (the main) 
culprit? 
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Some background:  
The British system of land use regulation 
13 
 Supply constraints and Greenbelts have 
long history...origin dates back until at least 
1580 
 Subjects of Queen Elizabeth I were commanded to 
“desist and forebare from any new building of any 
house or tenement within three miles of any of the 
gates” of the City of London “where no house hath 
been known” 
 But was never fully enforced and disappeared 
following Fire of London in 1666 
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Some background (cont.) 
14 
 Today’s planning system established in 
1947 through Town and Country Planning 
Act 
 Key features 
 expropriated development rights of land 
owners 
 Designated ‘use’ classes, whereas any change 
of ‘use’ requires development control 
permission (granted at local level) 
 Aim is ‘development control’ or ‘containment’ 
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What Greenbelt containment looks like… 
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5km 
Reading – 60km west of London 
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And in London… 
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Source: Barney’s blog  
(http://barneystringer.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/londons-green-belt) 
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The planning system does affect  
urban form… 
17 
 
Dutch concentrated dispersal 
Wider South East 
green belt constraint 
Flemish region dispersal Source: Echenique (2009) 
Reading 
 Similar densities 
 Less restrictive 
planning 
associated with 
more sprawl… 
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Who decides in UK? 
18 
 Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) grant or reject 
planning applications 
 Problem: Since 1947 virtually no fiscal incentives at 
local level to permit development (costs far exceed 
benefits) 
 Government reforms since 2010 not (yet) ‘biting’ 
 
 Underlying causes?  
 
 UK = highly centralized country, virtually no fiscal 
power at local level 
 Political power tilted towards homeowners (NIMBYs 
or better: BANANAs) 
 
 Local long-run supply curve nearly vertical… 
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Theoretical prediction… 
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How to test? 
21 
 Hilber and Vermeulen (2010, 2013) 
 Exploit spatial variation in three different 
types of supply constraints (regulatory, 
scarcity of developable land and topography) 
 Interact supply constraints with demand 
shifters (local earnings) 
 Use instrumental variable technique to 
identify causal effect of local supply 
constraints measures on local house prices 
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Average refusal rate 
(major residential 
projects) 1979-2008 
Share developable 
land developed, 
1990  
Elevation range 
  
Source: Hilber and Vermeulen (2013) 
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Main findings 
23 
 Tight local planning constraints in parts of 
England (in conjunction with strong 
demand) are to a good extent responsible 
for extraordinarily high house prices  
 
 Local scarcity of developable land matters 
but very non-linearly (only in most 
developed locations)  
 
 Topography matters in statistical sense but 
very little in economic (quantitative) sense… 
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Quantitative effects  
(based on IV with all instruments) 
24 
 If planning were completely relaxed  
in average LPA: 
 House prices in average LPA: -35% 
 and developable land were abundant: 
 House prices in average LPA: -45% (Δ= -10%) 
 and LPA were completely flat: 
 House prices in average LPA: -48% (Δ= -3%) 
 
 
Note: These are likely lower bound estimates for a number of reasons  
(see Hilber and Vermeulen 2010 and 2012 for details) 
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What would house prices in  
average English LPA be if… 
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North East vs. South East & 
90th vs. 10th percentile 
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 Had the SE the restrictiveness of the NE, 
house prices in the SE would be 25% lower! 
Intro – Stylized Facts                    Features of British system                    Empirical evidence                    Conclusions 
26 
But large variation across locations… 
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Columbus, OH
Evidence from another country 
with tightly and little regulated cities… 
28 
San Francisco, CA 
(inelastic supply & volatile 
demand) 
 
Columbus, OH 
(elastic supply) 
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Chattanooga, TN-GA
And another example 
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Chattanooga, TN-GA 
(elastic supply) 
Los Angeles 
(inelastic supply & volatile 
demand) 
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Columbus, OH
And based on deviation of HP  
from 50q past-trend HP… 
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San Francisco, CA 
(inelastic supply & volatile 
demand) 
 
Columbus, OH 
(elastic supply) 
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Chattanooga, TN-GA
Deviation of HP from 50q past-trend HP… 
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Chattanooga, TN-GA 
(elastic supply) 
Los Angeles 
(inelastic supply & volatile 
demand) 
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Los Angeles
But boom and bust also in places with 
elastic supply… 
32 
 Ireland for example underwent massive house price 
and construction boom  
 Followed by extensive price bust, high vacancy rates 
etc. 
 
 Unlikely caused by restrictive long-run supply… 
 Bust in Ireland characterized by massive ‘over-supply’ 
and high vacancy rates  
 ‘More severe bust than boom’ 
 
 Rather resembles boom and bust in Dallas and 
Houston in 1980s or Las Vegas and Phoenix during 
the 2000s… 
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Phoenix
The Puzzle… 
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Las Vegas
Las Vegas (elastic supply) 
Phoenix (elastic supply) 
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Low tier sales prices in Las Vegas and 
Phoenix and 15 other US MSAs 
Source: K.E. Case, in Land Lines (Lincoln Institute), pp. 8-13,  
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1743_Land-Lines-January-2010 
Intro – Stylized Facts                    Features of British system                    Empirical evidence                    Conclusions 
34 
So what might have happened in Ireland? 
35 
 Extraordinarily strong demand boost during 1990s 
and until mid 2000s (“Celtic Tiger years”) 
 
 Supply not sufficiently responsive in short-run (due to 
planning and construction lags) 
 House prices start rising significantly 
 
 “Myopic” agents start forming unrealistic 
expectations about future price rises 
 
 If supply is elastic in the longer-run (unlike in UK): 
Construction boom 
 
 Then ‘great recession’ hits and triggers bust phase 
with massive declines in house prices, vacancies, 
defaults & follow-on effects 
 Similar ‘stories’ in LV & Phoenix (DeFusco et al., 2013) 
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What about Dublin? 
36 
 Dublin appears to have tight regulatory constraints 
(including restrictive height controls) 
 Political-economical equilibrium probably tilted towards 
owners of developed land who are dominant in Dublin and 
who have incentive to oppose new development (similar to 
London, SF, LA) (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013) 
 Rest of Ireland appears to have elastic long-run 
supply 
 Owners of undeveloped land/developers of such land (who 
benefit from permission to develop) are arguably politically 
very influential relative to owners of developed land (Hilber 
and Robert-Nicoud, 2013) 
 This in combination with the common occurrence of 
corruption arguably lead to construction boom outside 
Dublin 
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A stylized explanation… 
*
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Unexpected initial demand boost  Price 
increase due to inelastic short-run supply (lags!) 
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Myopic (and/or) exuberant agents & elastic 
long-run supply cause construction boom 
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Bust phase (triggered by negative shock) can 
lead to over-supply/ high vacancies… 
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 What about impact of British 
planning system on retail markets 
and office markets? 
 
Two particularly interesting policy 
reforms… 
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Town Centre First policy 
44 
 ‘Town Centre First’ strictly implemented in 
England in 1996  
 ‘Needs test’: Need to prove that more shopping space is 
‘needed’ locally 
 ‘Sequential test’: Need to prove no more central site is  
available 
Made major out-of-town retail shopping in 
England difficult after 1988 and all but 
impossible after 1996 
 Put differently: Location and site-selection 
effectively ‘micro-managed’ by planners 
rather than supermarket chains… 
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Economic consequence? 
45 
 Exploiting a DiD-type setting, our estimates 
suggest that TCF policies imposed loss of 
output of some 32% on stores that opened 
in England after 1996 compared to stores 
that opened prior to 1988 (Cheshire et al., 
2013) 
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Last example: Nationalisation of  
‘business rate’ 
46 
 In 1990 Thatcher’s government converted the 
commercial property tax from a local to a national 
basis  
 Removing any fiscal incentives at local level to permit 
commercial development 
 
 Economic consequences? 
 Removal of fiscal incentives made supply of office space 
inelastic (no more incentives to approve developments) 
 Estimates suggest “regulatory tax” imposed on commercial 
firms in form of higher office space prices far exceeded 
revenue from business rate (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008) 
 The law of unintended consequences is powerful 
indeed… 
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Conclusions 
47 
 Planning serves important purpose - in principle it 
can improve welfare through correcting market 
failure such as externalities and public goods  
 
 But difficult to design system that strikes right 
balance  
 British system far too restrictive, but more flexible 
systems also have their downsides 
 Irish system seemingly did not get balance right 
either… 
 So, how should ideal system look like? 
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Some guiding principles:  
The ideal planning system should… 
48 
1. Focus on correcting market failures (externalities, 
public goods) that are endemic in land markets 
 
2. Work with the grain of the markets 
 Planners ought not micro-manage location choices or 
specific site selection (Cheshire et al., 2013) 
 Planners ought to take into account price signals (rather 
than ignore them) (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005) 
3. Align incentives 
 Those who bear the costs of development should also reap 
the benefits (Hilber and Vermeulen 2010, 2013) 
 Possible tools: impact fees (reflecting marginal social 
costs), genuine local property tax (& get rid of stamp duty) 
(Hilber and Lyytikäinen, 2013; Mirrlees et al., 2011) 
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One last point… 
49 
 In order to tackle ‘affordability problem’, policy 
makers tend to endorse policies that boost housing 
demand, especially demand for owner-occupied 
housing 
 Help to buy (in UK) 
 Mortgage interest deduction (in US and elsewhere) 
 No capital gains tax and no inheritance tax on principal 
owner-occupied dwelling (almost anywhere) 
 
 In places with tight regulatory constraints like in 
Britain, this merely increases house prices further 
making owner-occupied housing less – not more – 
affordable for young-would-be buyers (Hilber and 
Turner, forthcoming; Hilber 2013) 
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Q & A 
 
Thank you! 
 
Presentation with references & hyperlinks  
will be downloadable from:  
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hilber/ 
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